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CONSUMERS’W ILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE COLOR
OF SALMON:AC HOICE EXPERIMENT WITH REAL
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
FRODE ALFNES,A TLE G. GUTTORMSEN,G RO STEINE, AND KARI KOLSTAD
Inmostretailmarkets,sellerspostthepriceandconsumerschoosewhichproductstobuy.Wedesigned
an experimental market with posted prices to investigate consumers’ willingness to pay for the color
of salmon. Salmon ﬁllets varying in color and price were displayed in twenty choice scenarios. In
each scenario, the participants chose which of two salmon ﬁllets they wanted to buy. To induce real
economic incentives, each participant drew one binding scenario; the participants then had to buy the
salmon ﬁllet they had chosen in their binding scenario. The choice data were analyzed with a mixed
logit model.
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During the past decade, economists have used
experimentalmarketstoinvestigateconsumer
preferences and willingness to pay (WTP)
for food quality attributes. The most popular
method has been the second-price sealed-
bid Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961) where
participantssubmitsealedbidsfortheproduct
and the price is determined by the second-
highest bid, see, for example, Shogren et al.
(1994); Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003). The
Vickrey auction is an incentive-compatible
method for eliciting WTP. However, it is
an unfamiliar market mechanism for most
consumers. Consumers are more familiar with
markets where the seller posts prices and they,
as consumers, have to choose which products
to buy.
Lusk and Schroeder (2004a) designed an
experimental market with posted prices to
investigate consumers’ WTP for food quality
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attributes. Starting with ﬁve types of beef, they
askedparticipantstochoosewhichtheywould
prefer to buy in seventeen pricing scenarios.
To induce real economic incentives, one of the
price scenarios was randomly drawn as bind-
ing. The participants had to buy the type of
beef they had chosen in the binding scenario
andpaytherespectivepricepostedinthatsce-
nario. The choice task in such an experiment
is relatively close to that faced by consumers
in grocery stores every day. Furthermore, it is
in the participants’ own interest to choose the
alternative they prefer in each scenario, and
theirincentivetorevealtruepreferencesisrel-
atively transparent. An earlier application of a
nonhypotheticalchoiceexperimentisCarlsson
and Martinsson (2001), who investigated con-
sumers’ marginal WTP for donations to public
goods. We will refer to such nonhypothetical
choice experiments with posted prices as real
choice (RC) experiments.
We conducted an RC experiment to inves-
tigate consumers’ WTP for salmon with vari-
ous degrees of ﬂesh redness, and to investigate
whether information on the origin of the color
inﬂuencesconsumers’WTP.Weuseamodiﬁed
version of Lusk and Schroeder’s (2004a) RC
design. Lusk and Schroeder (2004a) used the
same ﬁve types of beef in all seventeen price
scenariosandusedafractionalfactorialdesign
to vary only the prices of the ﬁve alternatives
among the scenarios. In addition, they drew
only one binding scenario for the entire group
of participants. With this design, the choices
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arenotbetweenspeciﬁcpackages,butbetween
types or labels of products. We used scenario-
speciﬁc products and a fractional factorial de-
sign to vary both product attributes and prices
among the scenarios. In each scenario, we dis-
played two salmon ﬁllets with varying colors
and prices and the participants chose which
of the two salmon ﬁllets they wanted to buy.
To induce real economic incentives, each par-
ticipant drew a unique binding scenario. The
participants then had to buy the salmon ﬁllet
chosen in the binding scenario. The modiﬁed
RCdesignwithscenario-speciﬁcproducts,and
the use of a fractional factorial design to vary
bothproductattributesandpricesbetweenthe
scenarios, is very ﬂexible and can easily be
expanded to include more product attributes
and/or attribute levels.
Salmon are recognized for their pink-red
ﬂesh color, which distinguishes them from
other species. Consumers use intrinsic cues
such as color to infer the quality of food prod-
ucts. In surveys, as well as focus groups, con-
sumers have stated that they see the color of
salmon as an indicator of ﬂavor and fresh-
ness, and it has been shown that redness con-
tributes signiﬁcantly to the overall enjoyment
of salmon, see, for example, Anderson (2000);
Steine, Alfnes, and Rør˚ a (2005); Sylvia et al.
(1995). To our knowledge, there are no previ-
ously published consumer WTP studies using
experimental markets to investigate prefer-
ences for seafood attributes, however there
are a few studies using surveys (Holland and
Wessells 1998; Johnston et al. 2001; Steine,
Alfnes,andRør˚ a2005;Wessells,Johnston,and
Donath 1999).
Consumers’ WTP for the color of farmed
salmon is interesting for at least two reasons.
First, that while wild salmon obtain their char-
acteristic red color from the crustaceans they
eat in the sea, farmed salmon acquire their
color from synthetically produced feed addi-
tives. However, feed additives are expensive,
and the marginal return in terms of color is
decreasing and varies considerably between
individual salmon. Improved information on
consumer WTP for salmon with various de-
grees of redness will help producers optimize
coloring. A second issue is the ongoing de-
bate about the “color added” label on farmed
salmon. In recent years, consumer focus on
food safety, ethical production, and animal
welfare has increased, and food additives used
partly or purely for cosmetic reasons are sub-
ject to considerable debate. The U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, for example, requires
grocery stores to label farm-raised salmon so
that consumers are aware of the presence of
artiﬁcial coloring. The ﬁsh should be labeled
in the retail case and in individual packages
with the words “color added” or “artiﬁcially
colored.”
In2003,consumersintheUnitedStatesﬁled
a lawsuit against three major grocery chains to
force them to label the farm salmon as color
added (Smith and Lowney 2003). In a class
action complaint, it was stated: “As a result
of Defendant’s misbranding, concealment and
nondisclosure, consumers are misled to pur-
chase the artiﬁcially colored salmon and/or to
pay a greater price than they would otherwise
pay. Defendant has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of these consumers” (Smith
and Lowney 2003). Hence, Smith and Lowney
(2003) argue that consumers’ WTP for farmed
salmon would decrease if they knew the origin
of the color.
In a check of grocery stores in the United
States in 2005, we found that many stores still
sold farmed salmon that were not labeled with
color added and we found very few with color
addedlabelingintheretailcases.Furthermore,
ofthestoresthatdidlabelfarmedsalmon,sev-
eralusedlessnegativeexpressionssuchas“the
feeding process enhances the color” instead of
color added.
The remainder of the article proceeds as
follows: ﬁrst, we give some background in-
formation on farmed salmon, followed by a
presentation of the experimental procedure,
products, design of choice scenarios, sample,
econometricmodel,resultsanddiscussion,and
last, summary and conclusions.
Background
Duringthepastfewdecades,theproductionof
farmed salmon has experienced a growth sur-
passed by few other primary production com-
modities. Global production increased from
about12,000metrictonesin1980towellabove
one million metric tones in 2003. The increase
in production has been accompanied by a sub-
stantial decline in prices. The large increase
in production and decline in prices have sig-
niﬁcantly altered the structure of several mar-
kets, and affected the pattern of the interna-
tional salmon trade (Asche et al. 2005). One
of the biggest losers is the salmon ﬁshing in-
dustry in Alaska (Eagle, Naylor, and Smith
2004).Thechangeshaveledtoaseriesoftrade
disputes, and the largest producers of farmed1052 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
salmon, Norway and Chile, have been sub-
ject to dumping complaints in both the United
States and the EU. See Anderson and Fong
(1997), Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells (1999)
andAsche(2001)fordiscussionofsomeofthe
salmon trade dispute cases.
Themainfactorsbehindreducedproduction
costs are improved productivity and techno-
logical change. Today, ﬁsh farmers can, to a
greater extent, control growth and sexual ma-
turity, and such quality parameters as fat con-
tent, texture, taste, and color. However, while
better controls have reduced costs and im-
proved the ﬁnal product, the industrialization
ofthesalmonfarmingindustryhasatthesame
time led to criticisms from some researchers,
consumer groups, and environmentalists, see
for instance, Naylor et al. (2000).
One of the more controversial issues is
the use of synthetically produced colorants in
the salmon feed. The characteristic color of
salmoniscausedbydepositionsofcarotenoids
in the muscles. In the wild, salmon absorb
carotenoidsfromthecrustaceanstheyeat.The
most important carotenoid for the color of
salmon is astaxanthin. Salmon are unable to
biosynthesize astaxanthin, and thus, without
astaxanthin in their diet, the salmon’s ﬂesh
would range from gray or khaki to pale yel-
low or pale pink.
Many types of ﬁsh and crustaceans, includ-
ing trout, salmon, red sea bream, shrimp, and
lobster,accumulateastaxanthinintheirtissues
and skin. Astaxanthin is a powerful antioxi-
dant, and studies suggest that astaxanthin has
a series of biological and nutritional functions
in the species that accumulate it. Astaxanthin
has, for example, been found to increase fertil-
ization, and increase survival and growth rates
in these species.1
Farm-raised salmon, of course, do not have
accesstothenaturalsourcesofastaxanthin.To
impart the pink-red color in farmed salmon,
synthetically produced carotenoids, mainly as-
taxanthin, are added to their feed. However,
astaxanthin is expensive, and in conventional
salmon farming astaxanthin accounts for ap-
proximately 15% of the feed costs. Feed costs
inturnaccountfornearly50%oftotalproduc-
tion costs (Guttormsen 2002). Hence, coloring
is a relatively important cost in salmon farm-
ing. In 2003, the total cost of producing 1 kg
of slaughtered and gutted salmon in Norway
was approximately NOK 20, and the cost of
1 For a summary of the research on the connection between as-
taxanthin and animal health, see Astaxanthin (2006).
producing 1 kg of salmon ﬁllet was approxi-
mately NOK 34 (February 4, 2004).2
The internationally recognized method for
salmon color measurement is by comparing
the salmon ﬁllet ﬂesh with the colors in the
SalmoFanTM. The SalmoFan is a color fan de-
veloped on the basis of the color of salmonid
ﬂesh pigmented with astaxanthin. The color
of conventional farmed salmon ﬁllets sold in
the Norwegian market normally range from
twenty-three to thirty on the SalmoFan, and
most common are ﬁllets ranging from twenty-
ﬁve to twenty-seven. In a consumer study con-
ducted by Roche Vitamins,3 the producer of
astaxanthin for the salmon-farming industry,
they used color twenty-six as their base prod-
uct (Fish Farming International 2003).
Experimental Procedure
The experimental session included a survey,4 a
stated choice experiment, and an RC experi-
ment. The RC experiment consisted of three-
times ten choice scenarios. In each choice
scenario, the participants chose between two
salmon ﬁllets with posted prices. If none of
thealternativeswasofinterest,theycouldalso
choose a none-of-these (NOT) alternative. See
table 1 for an example of the choice experi-
ment questions. In this article, we analyze the
ﬁrst twenty RC scenarios that focused on the
color of salmon.5
The RC experiment had nine steps. Step 1:
The experimental procedure was explained to
the participants. Step 2: The participants stud-
iedthealternativesinscenariosonetoten,and
marked on a questionnaire which of the alter-
natives in each scenario they wanted to buy.
Step 3: The participants were informed about
the origin of the color, see table 2. Step 4: The
participants studied the alternatives in scenar-
ios eleven to twenty, and (as in Step 2) marked
on a questionnaire which of the alternatives in
each scenario they wanted to buy. Step 5: The
2 NOK 100 = EUR 11.44 = US$ 14.34. February 4, 2004.
(www.oanda.com).
3 DSM Nutritional Products, formerly Roche Vitamins and
Fine Chemicals, is the world’s leading supplier of vitamins and
carotenoidstothefeed,food,pharmaceutical,andcosmeticindus-
tries.RocheVitaminsandFineChemicalsbecamepartofDSMon
October 1, 2003.
4 The survey was divided into four parts. The participants
answered most questions before the choice experiment, some
questions after ten choice scenarios, others after twenty choice
scenarios, and the remaining questions after all thirty choice sce-
narios had been completed. We do not use the survey responses in
this article.
5 The last ten scenarios, focusing on organic and ecolabeled
salmon, are to be analyzed in another article.Alfnes et al. A Choice Experiment with Real Economic Incentives 1053
Table 1. Example of Choice Experiment
Question
400 g of farmed salmon
Alternative Alternative None of
Scenario 1 1 2 these
NOK 36 NOK 48
I would choose
(check  one)
Table2. InformationProvidedtoParticipants
The ﬁllets from wild salmon are usually pink red or
orange. The strength of the color can vary from
salmon to salmon. The color originates from
carotenoids in the ﬁsh’s diet. Carotenoids are
widespread in living organisms.
The most important carotenoid for the color of
salmon is astaxanthin. Astaxanthin is a common
substance in both freshwater and marine
organisms. Wild salmon obtain carotenoids from
eating crustaceans or small ﬁsh that themselves
have recently eaten such animals.
To create similar color in farmed salmon,
synthetically produced astaxanthin is added to
their feed. No negative side effects have been
reported from the use of astaxanthin.
participants were informed about organic and
eco-labeled salmon. Step 6: The participants
studied the alternatives in scenarios twenty-
one to thirty, and (as in Steps 2 and 4) marked
on a questionnaire which of the alternatives
in each scenario they wanted to buy. Step 7:
After all participants had completed all sce-
narios, each participant drew one card deter-
mining his or her binding scenario. The draw
was done without replacement, so that only
one participant was assigned to each scenario.
Step 8: Each participant received the salmon
ﬁllet he or she had chosen in his or her binding
scenario. Step 9: The participants went to the
cashierandpaidfortheirsalmonﬁllets.Forthe
instructions, see Alfnes et al. (2006).
The design of our experiment follows Lusk
and Schroeder (2004a) with some important
modiﬁcations. First, we used scenario-speciﬁc
products. We had thirty boxes ﬁlled with ice
on three large tables. Each of the boxes repre-
sented one scenario. In each box we displayed
two consumer packages of salmon ﬁllets. The
prices of the two alternatives were posted on
laminated paper in the back of the box. This
setupisveryﬂexibleandallowedustovarynot
onlytheprice,butalsotheproducts,amongthe
scenarios. Second, the participants chose be-
tween the exact product packages they could
obtain. Each participant randomly drew his or
herexclusivescenario,andtheparticipantwho
drew scenario four would obtain the ﬁllet he
or she had chosen in box number four. The
salmon ﬁllets they evaluated were the exact
sameﬁlletstheywouldbuy.Forthistobepossi-
ble, the number of participants in each session
had to be smaller than or equal to the number
of choice scenarios.
Third, the two alternatives in each box were
referred to as Alternative 1 and Alternative 2.
The only information that was posted in the
ﬁrsttwentychoicescenarioswastheprice.The
consumers had to infer the quality from intrin-
sic quality cues such as the color. Extending
the design to include other types of informa-
tionsuchaslabelingisstraightforward.Fourth,
the color, as well as the price, was a part of
the fractional factorial design, as was the posi-
tioning of the products as Alternative 1 or Al-
ternative 2. Any left- or right-hand-side bias
would therefore have no effect on the rela-
tive utility of the alternatives. Fifth, before the
ﬁrst ten scenarios we did not give the partici-
pants any information about how the salmon
ﬁllets differed. We said that we had various
types of farmed salmon ﬁllets, and asked the
participants to study the alternatives and
choose the alternative they would like to buy,
given the price. Only after the ﬁrst ten scenar-
ios, did we inform the participants about the
origin of the color. Sixth, to reduce any sys-
tematicorderingeffects,theparticipantscould
start at any of the ten scenarios on each ta-
ble. This also speeded up the process and we
avoided a queue in front of the ﬁrst scenario.
Our modiﬁcation of the design was inspired
by the growing literature on stated choice sur-
veys. Lusk and Schroeder (2004a) include all
alternatives in every scenario, and varied only
the prices among the scenarios. This limits the
number of alternatives that can be included
in the experiment. In the stated choice lit-
erature, consumers choose among alternative
productdescriptionsinhypotheticalscenarios.
Instatedchoicesurveysitiscommontoinclude
a large number of quality attributes, both ex-
istingandnonexisting.Toelicitconsumerpref-
erences for the attributes efﬁciently, fractional
factorial design is used to vary all attributes
among the scenarios. To lessen the cognitive
burden on the participants, only two or three
alternatives are usually included in each sce-
nario. For a thorough survey of stated choice1054 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
methodology and applications see Louviere,
Hensher, and Swait (2000).
As the number of product attributes or at-
tributelevelsincreases,thedifferencebetween
the number of products needed in the Lusk
andSchroeder(2004a)design,andthenumber
of products needed in a design with scenario-
speciﬁc products, increases considerably. In
a choice experiment where all products are
available in each choice scenario, it is possi-
ble that all participants end up with the same
product. Assuming that we have n alternatives
and m participants, we would then need m
products of each of the n alternatives, that is,
m×nproducts.Includingonlytwoalternatives
in each choice scenario and allowing each par-
ticipant to draw his or her exclusive scenario,
reduces the total number of products neces-
sary to 2 × m, or 2 × m/n products of each
alternative.
Products
To ensure wide variation in color, we bought
salmon from four different production sites:
three conventional salmon farms that utilize
synthetically produced astaxanthin and an or-
ganic salmon farm that uses astaxanthin only
from natural sources. We did not request spe-
ciﬁccolors,andthecolorvariationweobtained
is largely a result of the producers’ inability
to produce salmons with a homogenous color.
Thesalmonﬁlletswerecutintoportionsweigh-
ing approximately 400 g,6 put into packaging
familiar to consumers and precisely weighed.
We also recorded if the ﬁllet portions were
from the front or tail of the ﬁllet. The ﬁl-
lets were categorized into color categories us-
ing the internationally recognized method for
color measurement for salmon, the SalmoFan.
Fillets from the conventional salmon farms
ranged in color from twenty-three to thirty
on the SalmoFan, and those from the organic
salmon farm ranged from twenty to twenty-
two. The ﬁllets were grouped into ﬁve color
categories,hereafterreferredtoasalternatives
R21, R23, R25, R27, and R29.
The price attribute had the levels NOK 24,
30, 36, 42, and 48. This corresponds to a price
per kilogram of NOK 60, 75, 90, 105, and 120,
respectively. The week before the experiment,
the prices of salmon ﬁllets in the three largest
6 The mean weight was 400.28 g with a standard deviation of
40.25 g. To avoid weight playing an important role in choice, we
imposeda10%upperlimitonhowmuchchoicepairswereallowed
to differ.
grocery stores in the area were NOK 79, 89,
and 119 per kilogram. Thus, all prices except
forthatofNOK24per400g/NOK60perkilo-
gram were within a familiar price range for
salmon ﬁllets in the area.
Nonprocessedfoodproducts,suchassalmon
ﬁllets, are heterogeneous in so many ways
that we cannot normally obtain products that
areuniformacrossallcharacteristics.Allowing
thecolorcategoriestoberepresentedbymore
thanasingleproductgivesabetterrepresenta-
tion of the categories than selecting one prod-
uct from each category. In our experiment,
we had eight sessions, and each session had
twenty color scenarios. Each color category
wasincludedeighttimesineachsession.Were-
placed the ﬁllets each day, and the ﬁllets sold
in the ﬁrst session every night were replaced
with new ﬁllets. The total number of ﬁllets dis-
played in the color experiment was 197, di-
vided into ﬁve color categories. On average,
eachcolorcategorywasrepresentedbyalmost
forty salmon ﬁllets in the experiment. This rel-
atively high number of salmon ﬁllets in each
color category reduced the effect on the WTP
estimates of any unrecorded attributes of one
speciﬁc salmon ﬁllet.
Design Choice Scenarios
We used the SAS macro described in Kuhfeld
(2001) to generate a fractional factorial de-
sign with forty choice scenarios.7 Each sce-
nario had two alternatives described by color
and price, both ﬁve-level attributes. To avoid
clearly dominated alternatives, we limited the
design to scenarios where the color of the
two alternatives differed. There were, how-
ever, no limitations on the price attribute, and
several scenarios had the same price for both
alternatives. The scenarios were divided into
four blocks, and randomly arranged within
the blocks. SAS reported a D-efﬁciency of
96.85 for the design. Each block of scenar-
ios was used once as scenarios one to ten,
and in another session as scenarios eleven to
twenty. Other product-speciﬁc attributes such
as the ﬁllet thickness, visible fat, exact weight,
and ﬁllet cut were not included in the design,
but were randomized in the drawing of the
products. For a further discussion of fractional
7 Notwithstandingthestatisticaladvantagespossessedbyacom-
plete factorial, such designs are practical only for choice exper-
iments with very few attributes and levels. In our case, the full
factorial design without (with) restrictions had 54 = 625(53 × 4 =
500) choice sets.Alfnes et al. A Choice Experiment with Real Economic Incentives 1055
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Variable Deﬁnition Meana Std. dev.
Gender Gender of participant 1.43 0.49
Female = 1; Male = 2
Age Age of participant (in years) 38.81 10.29
Income Total income of householdb 5.62 2.63
(in NOK 100,000)
Education Highest completed education 2.54 0.67
Elementary school = 1
High school = 2
College/University = 3
a Corresponding ﬁgures for the population between twenty and sixty years old in the Oslo area are 1.49, 39.80, 5.89,
and 2.41, respectively.
b The income question had six classes. The midpoints of classes are used in the estimation.
factorial design, see Louviere, Hensher, and
Swait (2000).
Sample
The experiment was conducted at
MATFORSK, The Norwegian Food Re-
search Institute, across four nights in February
2004. We conducted two sessions each night,
and each session lasted approximately one
and a half hours. Each session had between
thirteen and sixteen participants. In total, 115
participants were recruited through various
local civic organizations, including choirs and
soccer teams, in southeastern Norway. In
each organization, the contact person was
instructed to provide a sample of regular con-
sumers, between twenty-ﬁve and sixty-year
old, with an approximately equal division of
sexes. The organizations were given NOK 200
for each participant they recruited, and the
participants were given NOK 300 to take part
in the experiment.8
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for
thesample.Theparticipants’agesrangedfrom
twenty to sixty-three years, with an average of
thirty-nineyears.Fifty-eightpercentofthepar-
ticipants were women. The average household
income was NOK 562,000. One participant
who said he did not eat ﬁsh, and ﬁfteen par-
ticipants who chose the NOT alternative in all
choice scenarios were excluded from the anal-
ysis. The sample used in the estimation com-
prises the remaining ninety-nine respondents.
8 Norway has a high organizational participation rate. In the
Oslo area, for example, 49% of the population actively partici-
pates in at least one organization (Statistics Norway). Recruiting
through organizations can then yield a representative sample of
the population.
Econometric Model
We analyzed the RC data with a mixed logit
(also known as a random parameter logit)
model. The mixed logit obviates three of the
limitations of the standard logit model by al-
lowingforrandomtastevariation,unrestricted
substitution patterns, and correlation in un-
observed factors over time (Train 2003). Fur-
thermore, McFadden and Train (2000) show
that under mild regularity conditions, any dis-
crete choice model derived from random util-
ity maximization has choice probabilities that
can be approximated as closely as one pleases
by a mixed logit model.
Let us assume that the individual’s utility
from each alternative can be decomposed into
a linear-in-parameters part that depends on
observable variables, and an error term that
is an independently and identically distributed
(iid) extreme value. Given these assumptions,
the utility of individual n from alternative i in
choice scenario s is denoted by
Unis =  
 xnis +   
nznis + εnis (1)
wherexnis andznis arevectorsofobservedvari-
ables relating to alternative i;   is a vector of
ﬁxedcoefﬁcients; isavectorofrandomterms
withmeanzero;andεnis isaniidextremevalue
error term. The terms in   are error compo-
nents that, along with εnis, deﬁne the stochas-
tic portion of the utility. The standard logit is
a special case of the mixed logit where   has
zero variance.
The density of   is denoted by f( |Ω),
where Ω is the ﬁxed parameter of the distri-
bution. For a given  , the conditional choice
probability is a standard logit1056 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Lni( ) =
e  xni+  
nzni
 
j∈J e  xnj+  
nznj . (2)
Consequently, the unconditional choice prob-
ability, P, in the mixed logit model is the logit
formulaintegratedoverallvaluesof withthe
density of   as weights
Pni =
 
Lni( ) f ( |Ω)d . (3)
This integral cannot be solved analytically
and is approximated through simulation
(Brownstone and Train 1999).
IntheRCcolorexperiment,theparticipants
were asked to make twenty choices between
salmon ﬁllets offered at various prices. The
choice data were analyzed with the following
mixed logit model
Unis = ( 0i + 1Tailnis + 2iIDs + ni)Weightnis
+ 3Pricenis + 4Price24nis +εnis
(4)
where 0i isthealternativespeciﬁcconstantfor
alternative i, ASC(i) (in other words, there is
oneconstantforeachcolor);Tailnis isadummy
variable taking the value of one if the prod-
uct is a tail ﬁllet, and zero otherwise; IDs is a
dummy variable taking the value of zero be-
fore the color information was given and one
afterwards;  ni is an error term that is triangu-
larlydistributed,heteroskedastic,independent
between alternatives, and perfectly correlated
over choices made by the same individual;9
Weightnis is the exact weight of the alternative
i in kilograms; Pricenis is the price of alterna-
tivei;Price24nis isadummytakingthevalueof
oneifthepriceisNOK24,andzerootherwise.
For the estimation purposes, the weight of the
NOT alternative is set to one. For identiﬁca-
tion,thealternative-speciﬁcparametersforthe
palest alternative, R21, is normalized to zero.
Multiplying the alternative speciﬁc con-
stants (ASCs) the tail variable and the infor-
mationdummies(IDs)withtheweight,implies
a linear increase in utility with an increase in
weight for all varieties of ﬁllets. For example,
the utility of a 420-g ﬁllet is assumed to be 5%
higher than the utility of a 400-g ﬁllet with the
9 The main reason we chose the triangular distribution over the
normal distribution was that the former is a limited distribution.
Hence, the triangular distribution does not imply that anyone has
an unlimited high WTP for salmon. See Hensher and Greene
(2003)foradiscussionofvariousdistributionsonthenon-iiderror
term in mixed logit models.
same color, and the utility of a 420-g tail ﬁl-
let is assumed to be 5% higher than the utility
of a 400-g tail ﬁllet with the same color. The
Price24 dummy is included to capture any ad-
verse effects of offering the salmon ﬁllets at a
price below that normally seen in the market.
ThemeanWTPperkilogramofalternativei
can be calculated by dividing the utility differ-
encebetween1kgofalternativeiandtheNOT
alternative,withthenegativeofthepricesensi-
tivity parameter. Because the price sensitivity
parameter measures the utility of the price in
NOK 100, we multiply the result by 100 to get
the WTP in NOK
WTPis =− 100
×
( 0i + 1Tailis + 2iIDs)−( 0NOT + 2NOTIDs)
 3
(5)
where WTPis is the estimated mean WTP per
kilogram of alternative i in scenario s; and
all other variables and parameters are as de-
scribed in equation (4).
Results and Discussion
In our design, there was no correlation be-
tween color and price and no correlation be-
tween the price of alternative 1 and the price
of alternative 2. Therefore, one would expect
that, on average, the choice probability for an
alternative increased as the price decreased.
This was the case as long as the price was
within the familiar range of NOK 30 to NOK
48 per 400 g. However, when the price was re-
duced from NOK 30 to NOK 24, the average
choice probability for an alternative was re-
duced. On average, the percentage of the par-
ticipants who chose an alternative with a price
of NOK 48 was 30.76. This increased to 35.98
for NOK 42, 37.71 for NOK 36, and 42.86 for
NOK 30, but decreased to 36.78 for NOK 24.
The NOK 24 price lies below that normally
seen in the market, and it appears that this low
price was viewed as a signal of lower quality.10
Not controlling for this would give a price sen-
sitivity parameter that was closer to zero, and
thereby higher WTP values.
10 An alternative explanation is that respondents are reluctant
to choose the lowest priced product when there is quite a large
price range. NOK24 was the lowest price included in the market
experiment and as such may be perceived as a signal of lower
quality. In other words, the NOK24 effect might be a result of the
price range used in the experiment, and not the price range found
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Table 4. Estimated Parameters for the Mixed Logit Models
Model 1 Model 2
(with Price24 dummy) (without Price24 dummy)
Std. Std.
Variable Para. err. p-value Para. err. p-value
Generic variables
Pricea −3.55 0.63 0.00 −1.94 0.44 0.00
Price24 −0.49 0.14 0.00
Tailb −0.20 0.33 0.54 −0.46 0.33 0.16
Alternative speciﬁc constants
ASC(R23) 3.16 0.53 0.00 3.06 0.52 0.00
ASC(R25) 3.57 0.52 0.00 3.65 0.52 0.00
ASC(R27) 3.45 0.54 0.00 3.44 0.53 0.00
ASC(R29) 4.26 0.56 0.00 4.41 0.56 0.00
ASC(NOT)c −1.20 0.41 0.00 −0.50 0.36 0.16
Information dummies
ID(R23) −0.59 0.72 0.41 −0.73 0.71 0.31
ID(R25) −0.10 0.72 0.88 −0.45 0.71 0.53
ID(R27) 1.00 0.72 0.17 0.92 0.72 0.20
ID(R29) −1.15 0.70 0.10 −1.24 0.70 0.07
ID(NOT) −0.14 0.43 0.75 −0.22 0.44 0.61
Summary statistics
Number of observations 1,977 1,977
Number of participants 99 99
LLd standard logit −2,051 −2,058
LL mixed logit −1,808 −1,814
Note: Estimated with Nlogit 3.0.
aPrice in NOK 100.
bTail is one if tail, zero otherwise. The variable is centralized before the estimation.
cNOT stands for None of These.
dLL stands for Log-Likelihood.
Table 4 shows the estimated parameters,
standard errors, and p values for the mixed
logit model, with and without the Price24
dummy. The Price and NOT parameters
change considerably when we exclude the
Price24 dummy. The Price parameter changes
because the adverse reaction to the NOK 24
price is not accounted for with a dummy, but
instead is interpreted as a lack of price sen-
sitivity. Furthermore, with a reduced absolute
valueonthePriceparameter,theNOTparam-
etermustincreasetocompensateforthelossin
the NOT alternatives’ relative utility resulting
from its zero price.
We now concentrate the discussion on
model 1. From the lower part of table 4,
we can see that the mixed logit model (log
likelihood = –1,808) ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly
better than the more restrictive standard logit
model (log likelihood = –2,051). The ASCs
represent the utility per kilogram of the al-
ternativesbeforeweinformedtheparticipants
about the origin of the color. It is worth noting
thatthesecolorpreferenceswereelicitedwith-
out telling the participants that they should fo-
cusoncolor.TheASCsforthecolorsR23,R25,
R27, and R29 are all positive and signiﬁcant.
Thismeansthatonaveragetheconsumerspre-
ferred these colors to the paler R21. Further-
more, the alternative with the highest utility is
thereddestalternative,namelyR29.Theutility
of R29 is signiﬁcantly higher than the utility of
the paler R23 (Wald, p-value = 0.00), and R27
(Wald, p-value = 0.02), and is higher, but not
signiﬁcantly, than R25 (Wald, p-value = 0.07).
Nosigniﬁcantdifferenceswerefoundbetween
alternatives R23, R25, and R27. However, the
average utility of R25, R27, and R29 is signif-
icantly higher than the utility of R23 (Wald,
p-value = 0.05).
The ASCs plus the IDs represent the util-
ity per kilogram of the alternatives after we
informed the participants about the origin
of the color. None of the utilities changed
signiﬁcantly after the color information was
presented, however the IDs are jointly sig-
niﬁcant (Wald, p-value = 0.00). The utilities
of the colors R23, R25, R27, and R29 are1058 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
still positive and signiﬁcant. This means that
the average consumer prefers redder colors
to the paler R21, even after they know the
origin of the color. However, the utility of
the reddest alternative, R29, decreased signif-
icantly relative to the utility of R25 (Wald,
p-value = 0.05) and R27 (Wald, p-value =
0.00), and decreased, but not signiﬁcantly, rel-
ative to the utility of R23 (Wald, p-value =
0.26). After the color information was sup-
plied, the utility of R27 is signiﬁcantly higher
than the utility of R23 (Wald, p-value = 0.00),
R25 (Wald, p-alue = 0.01), and R29 (Wald, p-
value = 0.00). Furthermore, the average util-
ity of R25, R27, and R29 is signiﬁcantly higher
than the utility of R23 (Wald, p-value = 0.00).
The number of tail ﬁllets was unevenly dis-
tributed among the ﬁve color categories and
was most frequent in the R29 category. The
tail parameter was found not to be signiﬁcant,
although the negative value indicated that the
participants preferred the thicker front part of
the ﬁllet to the tail of the ﬁllet.
Table 5 presents the WTP per kilogram
of the ﬁve alternatives. As discussed, partici-
pants preferred the reddest alternative, R29,
when they were uninformed, and the slightly
paler R27 when informed about the origin of
the color. After receiving the color informa-
tion, the participants still preferred fairly red
salmon, but they seemed to have become a lit-
tle skeptical with respect to salmon that was
redder than usual. This is reﬂected in ﬁgure 1
wheretheconcavenatureoftheWTPforcolor
is evident.
The effect of the color additives on the in-
dividual salmons varies and producers are not
able to produce salmon with a homogenous
color. The concave nature of the WTP func-
tion implies that consumers, on average, are
willing to pay less for a batch of salmon with
varying color than for a batch with the same
mean color, but with no variation in color. Let
Table 5. Willingness to Pay per Kilogram of
Salmon by Color
Before After
Information Information
Color WTP Std. err WTP Std. err
R21 33.87 9.33 37.87 8.96
R23 123.11 19.37 110.55 17.39
R25 134.44 21.46 135.49 20.13
R27 131.11 21.02 163.33 25.05
R29 154.14 24.97 125.81 20.71
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
R21 R23 R25 R27 R29
Color
N
O
K
Before information After information
Figure 1. Willingness to pay per kilogram of
salmon by color before and after receiving
information
us, as an example, assume that 25% of salmon
end up in a color category lower and 25% in
a color category higher, than the category the
producer aimed for. On this basis, if the pro-
ducer aims, say, for R23 he or she can expect
to produce 25% R21, 50% R23, and 25% R25.
Before information, the weighted average
WTP over the three colors R21, R23, and R25,
was NOK103.63, which is signiﬁcantly lower
than the NOK 123.11 reported for R23 in
table 5 (Wald, p-value = 0.00). Similarly, the
weighted average WTP for salmon with mean
colors of R25 and R27 were NOK 130.77 and
NOK 137.70,11 respectively. The weighted av-
erage WTP for the salmon with mean colors
of R25 and R27 were signiﬁcantly higher than
theweightedaverageWTPforthesalmonwith
a mean color of R23 (Wald, p-value = 0.00;
Wald, p-value = 0.00, respectively). After re-
ceiving the information, the weighted aver-
age WTP for salmon with mean colors R23,
R25, and R27 were, respectively, NOK 98.61,
NOK136.21, and NOK 146.99.
Similarly to the situation before informa-
tion, the weighted average WTP for the
salmon with mean colors of R25 and R27
was still signiﬁcantly higher than the weighted
average WTP for the salmon with a mean
color of R23 (Wald, p-value = 0.00; Wald,
p-value = 0.00, respectively). Comparing the
weighted average WTP for the heteroge-
neously colored salmon, with the WTP for the
homogenously color salmon (as reported in
table 5), we can see that the concave nature
of the WTP for salmon color gives a higher
optimal color in the heterogeneous color case
11 Although, the WTP function overall has a concave nature, it is
notsmooth,andhasanunexplaineddipatR27beforeinformation.
This causes the weighted average WTP of R25, R27, and R29 to
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than in the homogenous color case. With het-
erogeneouscolors,theweightedaverageWTP
for salmon with mean colors of R25 and R27
is signiﬁcantly higher than the weighted av-
erage WTP for salmon with a mean color
of R23, both before and after the informa-
tion. The higher the variability in color, the
more color additives the producer should use
to ensure that none of the salmon falls short
of R23.
In a companion article to Lusk and
Schroeder (2004a), Lusk and Schroeder
(2004b) compared WTP estimated from their
RC experiment with WTP elicited in four
different types of auction mechanisms. They
found that the RC experiment gave sig-
niﬁcantly higher total and marginal WTP
estimates than the auctions. Whereas auction
participants appear limited by outside options
and rarely bid higher than the market price,
RC participants often chose high-priced alter-
natives. The average WTP found in their RC
experimentwasinlinewiththemarketpriceof
the products, suggesting that many of the par-
ticipants must have been willing to pay more
than the average market price in the choice
experiment.
Recalling that the price of salmon ﬁllets in
local stores ranged from NOK 79 to NOK 119
the week before the experiment, we note that
the level of the WTP estimates presented in
table 5 is somewhat high. The average WTP
for the two most common colors, R25 and
R27, was 15.65% and 12.57% higher, respec-
tively, before the information was received,
and 14.02% and 37.16% higher after the infor-
mation was received than the highest market
price we found in the local stores. Given the
market prices, the price premium of between
NOK 73 and NOK 125 for added color implies
that the average consumer would not buy R21
salmon at any price.
There are several potential sources of an
upward bias in RC experiments. The partici-
pants may not take their outside options fully
into account, and choose the NOT alterna-
tivetooinfrequently.Theparticipantsmayalso
be less price-sensitive in an RC experiment
where they are offered only one product and
allowed to buy only a single piece of the prod-
uct than in a real market. The price sensitivity
directly affects both the marginal and the to-
tal WTP estimates through the denominator
in equation (5). A higher percentage of NOT
choiceswouldincreasetheestimatedutilitypa-
rameter for the NOT alternative, and through
equation (5), reduce the level of all salmon
WTP estimates. However, it is important to
realize that including the ﬁfteen participants
choosing the NOT alternative in all twenty
scenarios would not have helped much. We
employed a panel version of the mixed logit
model, where all choices made by one par-
ticipant are clustered together. Including ﬁf-
teen participants who make the same choice
in all twenty scenarios would have little ef-
fect on the parameter included in equation
(5). However, it would signiﬁcantly increase
the variance of the non-iid error term associ-
atedwiththeNOTalternative.Wearestillina
very early stage in the use of RC experiments,
and further research is necessary before we
fully understand how prices, outside options,
andotherframingeffectsinﬂuenceconsumers’
decisions.
Summary and Conclusion
In RC experiments, consumers face choices
involving real products and money in a se-
ries of choice scenarios. The choice task is
relatively similar to the choices consumers
face in real world grocery stores. The incen-
tives for revealing one’s true preferences are
transparent. This makes the RC experiments
an incentive-compatible method for eliciting
WTP for food-quality attributes. The design
of the experiments and the analysis of the
data are based on methods developed for hy-
pothetical choice experiments. We modiﬁed
Lusk and Schroeder’s (2004a) RC design by
using scenario-speciﬁc products and a unique
binding scenario for each participant. This in-
creasesﬂexibility,allowstheuseofafractional
factorialdesigntovarybothproductattributes
and the prices, permits the incorporation of
a larger number of product attributes and at-
tributelevels,andgivesparticipantsthechoice
between speciﬁc product packages not just
product types. The greater the number of at-
tributes and levels, the more important it is to
use a fractional factorial design to vary prod-
uct attributes, which again makes it necessary
to use scenario-speciﬁc products.
The RC experiment presented in this article
focuses on the color of salmon. The pink-red
colorisoneofthemostimportantqualitytraits
for Atlantic salmon. Consumers use color as a
quality indicator and are willing to pay signif-
icantly more for salmon ﬁllets with normal or
above-normalredness,ascomparedwithpaler
salmonﬁllets.Withoutartiﬁcialcoloring,farm-
raised salmon would be difﬁcult to market and1060 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
would probably command signiﬁcantly lower
prices.
We found that most of the increase in WTP
for color is before R25, and that salmon with
color below R23 on the SalmoFan are difﬁ-
cult to sell at any price. Because producers are
not able to produce a homogenous color, they
shouldaimforR25orreddertoensurethatfew
salmon fall short of R23. However, consumer
WTPforthedegreeofrednessisonlyonepart
of the information necessary to ﬁnd the opti-
mal level of coloring for salmon. In addition,
it is necessary to know the cost of increasing
the average color, the color variation at differ-
ent levels of color additives, and the extent to
which producers are able to retrieve the con-
sumers’ WTP. The concave nature of the WTP
forcolorsuggeststhataverageWTPdecreases
whenthespreadincolorsincreases.Therefore,
it is important that the concave nature of the
WTP for color is taken into account when de-
termining the weight the color spread should
have in the salmon-breeding goal.
Informingconsumersabouttheoriginofthe
color does not affect the WTP for pale and
normal red ﬁllets. However, this information
does inﬂuence the WTP for above-normal red
ﬁllets, which decreases signiﬁcantly. These re-
sults indicate that color-added labeling would
have little effect on the demand for the most
common color categories of farmed salmon.
[Received September 2004;
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